Australian States by unknown
Archived at the Flinders Academic Commons:
http://hdl.handle.net/2328/27231
This is a scan of a document number DUN/Speeches/3622




Please acknowledge the source as:
Dunstan Collection, Flinders University Library.
Identifier: DUN/Speeches/3622
© Copyright Estate Donald Allan Dunstan
_l kfc A.u&Uca. U-^t^v .feufc&o ^dhi^O Wi^xZ^j ~ 
QjUW—i^ Q^a ^cU^Xk ; j#. ~d°JL -VteeX . tt^Jtsc _ . 
___ -r=> w \ 
^JbcuUL— "Xfr ... _ sr^tt^xJ^—"fcfr - C ^ v O i v 
pj-^unA.'' U^U^^J UJL -T& XLSL ^ 
rl&O-Cttu^  ^  QuOt&JL WJ&vSX V x CxCcr-N^cv 3 
WCVA.C'L - kflut-c^ c ^ t ^ V ^-t^y-lck^i^ 
All 
ClT&Oi 
. ^^"^/^-©-vv , 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
Cto. —. Uttfe --- m&rr^ 
O^A. CsCLSt . 3 l X W*--,, 
\ 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
V\A-_ 
-^cn^ Ishejt- OrvM^^ Wuus&^Ltf t^^-M-Po O^Jul. 
^ e ^ - t W a X • 
. v s n v ^ e ^ cJK-^^f-fc-^ 0 y a ^ ^ ^ x i r - ^ ^ 
. /V&Ja-L&i y^t-d-x-
^ _ ^ • \ - • • _ Y ' _ ^ 
LJL J^Ji 
a^tz^e^ji dSv^ jL i 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
^JLt tstdl - CsO^JLnd* ^  {y^ X^rAs. . f>-v«w( 
^rfTT ^  n ? r rw'irt p r u t X Z u u ^ 
-Ysjz^ - Lt&^uJj ^MAj-ts^rx^^jf^L.. t "/Tea. t 
^/PCe^ '-yU-A-^.. - IsfLeiX ^"CcL^i /t-eusrev^ 
_ ^^C&^JLJ- . iX-cJT. U<\A ^T&Jtfy A-^X. 
a Xr 
• - - - - - • - - - v- ^ 
V- -
-A 




j l / t v . il111 i UL ia-
.... "Tb y^-jtjzsfr Jsf&k, ^ - v ^ ^ ^ ^ v o ^ ^ j ^ 
C^XA CtiJl X^^LCe^ "^E&J jj&rryf*^^, 
' A 
fltt 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.




"X<T t^-* Q C&XsLr ^ 
TL U-C^Cery^S* LcJUU^JT 
xJfiA - SX^tcf^ -
7 
'vlM-e^X* 
- ""TlLc. Uctxi-cl- ^Lsrsf^S^&xfe* \ATI)L-». 
.. C^.T^la. Ccr^-^ jfZ&Z^F*' v x o ' 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
7 
_ _ 
• ... - V 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
f 
^ C U s - U J T U . A-w cUte^ronZp-^ — 
L 
(X ^ XLsl^, 1) v o t n ... ^ P-fVCrvJ U^C, 
^fc-e^ - JZe**^-*^- byA^ <jrtN?-fc#f ^ jtfruj-u^. 
... ^ n T v J T <-7 . cJLc*ULe(( t^U. QfeJL, 
luk-^Ji. VVLJ /Ley a 
^X&sfyi (^Z&^tCLrtsT f vn^txiAy ijisdj^i+jl ^^ti^t^tJ^-VK^ 
... I ... csfl^et**^-^ . U^v J^j^JZ-t^ I^T&K Co-^-^X^-TZ^w. 
U L - . X I h / 4 . X .<7. 
- / u 
V 
X t - vanilo ... T C ^ v w h ^ - l ^ - NS-B-rs^ 
^ Ut^Ce - jv^y^e-t-tf ^ ... J^Vk ^xJ-fJT 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
1-
- j^-e-s^. - Xc- _ T^cc^- - v v j h ^ T . 
A / s - o - * - ^ 'LJL+J^j*. ^ JU-cuzju^A . T T u i 7 
. 0 _ 
Lsj^f. . 
f&^tjU. Its,, XlT >^1 ^^  "tc L^JUjUS^ Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
I a 
V-v C^KjLjtXt QW-k 9 _ <L 
. Z^s ~XJt*Sl 'Vu-lL-A ^ Ij) 
^ iLizti^cZi ^ ^ bDd'Crtief 
. JLfi^cne^LA^LsiT^* to - . ^ U-V^jC^V _ C^ULW^ CO—W— 
VUj? $ th&i uo^ ^ j^^^ttX. ^ 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
l< 
£ £ 4 
Jsy-^-^jdrj.. 
v u ^ v j y . /Ltv-y _ ( X ^ t ^ t M ^ M U f ^ L w i v ^ e^ 
\S-< O-^-^e • - . . 
Dunstan Collection, Special Collections, Flinders University Library.
- 1 -
The Australian States grew mostly from a series of accidents: the need for a 
remote place to which to transport convicts after Britain's loss of the 
American colonies and the overcrowding of the prison hulks led to the 
settling of New South Wales and Tasmania, and the eventual spread of 
settlement to Victoria and Queensland; the desire for systematic 
colonisation caused the settlement in Perth which barely survived, and 
Adelaide, which did only marginally better. Boundaries of the colonies were 
drawn in England, and bore little relation to the commonalty of interest 
which could make for viable areas of local administration. But in the 
latter half of the last century, following the 1845 Act for the better 
governing of the colonies, the States grew up within those boundaries as 
separate little nations - each with its own Parliament, modelled on the 
Westminster System its own public service, education system, armed forces, 
financial institutions, laws and means of enforcing them. 
Moreover, since customs duties were an important part of revenue, each 
enforced customs barriers against the others. 
The move to federation of the colonies obtained the support of the majority 
because for the sake of economy and trade it made good sense: the provision 
of a common defence force, of common administration of posts and 
telegraphs, currency and customs. But it was, and was seen as, federation, 
and not unification. In a country as vast as Australia, with a largely 
urban population and long distances between the greater conurbations, 
national parliament often appears to the average citizen somewhat remote. 
Anyone involved in politics in this country who has made a regular practice 
of door-knocking the constituency can tell you that commitment to local 
issues and concerns is far stronger that interest in matters of seemingly 
national importance. 
In each State of Australia, the institutions of finance, housing, the 
criminal law, the laws relation to town planning and consumer protection, 
(provisions of electricity), water, sewerage, and public works all differ 
markedly from elsewhere because of the different ways the colonies grew in 
their first hundred and more years. Policies made centrally and nationally 
on these and other matters often produce anomalies which are harmful to 
citizens in one or more of the States. 
That said, the very requirements of modern finance, banking, and economic 
management have ensured a centralising of fiscal policy and controls on trade 
and investment. It has also meant, as we shall see, the steady erosion of 
the States' abilities to control their own financial destinies, and has made 
of them in fact, though not in law, subordinate legislatures. The claim, 
often still made, that the States, having the great area of residual powers, 
(i.e. the powers not designated as those of the Commonwealth in Section 51 
of the Constitution) were "sovereign" states as regards those matters, is 
very hollow when it is realised that the States are almost wholly dependent 
on the decisions of the Commonwealth Government to have enough money to 
carry out day-to-day administration. That, of course, was not the intention 
of the framers of the Constitution, but a brief history of the change in 
financial control will illustrate how far it has reached. 
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The first major change occurred in the 1920s when the amount of debt 
undertaken by the States through overseas borrowing had reached alarming 
proportions. The Financial Agreement between the States and the 
Commonwealth, specified that future borrowings must be authorised by Loan 
Council, representative of the States and the Commonwealth. On the Loan 
Council all parties have an equal vote and decisions must be unanimous. 
That would seem to protect the States' powers. However, as subsequently the 
Commonwealth became the major revenue raiser, and the public works programs 
of the States needed support from that revenue because the amount Australia 
could raise in public borrowings at rates which were economically sound was 
not enough to meet the whole cost, the Commonwealth could call the tune as 
to size of the program and impose conditions as to its content. Loan 
Council is a place where State Treasurers may bleat in protest, but the 
Federal Treasurer has the whole say. 
Then in war-time, the major blow fell. The Commonwealth and the States both 
until then had imposed income and company taxes. The Commonwealth imposed a 
tax in these areas which covered all the field previously the subject of the 
States' taxes, with a condition that if the States did not impose taxes on 
incomes of individuals or companies the Commonwealth would grant back to the 
States some of the monies collected. The High Court held that this was a 
valid use of Commonwealth power, and the fate of the States' financial 
independence was sealed. The Commonwealth can and does decide how much of 
what it collects it will pay to the States, and has been able to ensure that 
any threats by the States to impose their own taxes on income and companies 
come to nought. 
The third problem for the States was the widened view taken by the High 
Court in the late 60s and 70s of the meaning of "excise" taxes. Under the 
Federal Constitution, in order to create an effective customs union for the 
whole country, the Commonwealth was given exclusive power to impose customs 
and excise duties. The States had, as one of their few sources of 
substantial revenue, stamp duties on various transactions, and a major item 
of stamp duty was the requirement of duty on receipts for purchases of 
goods. When William McMahon was Prime Minister, the High Court ruled that 
the States' imposition of such a tax was unlawful because it was, in effect, 
an "excise" on the cost of the goods. The State Treasurers were aghast, and 
McMahon offerred that in place of receipt duty, the Commonwealth would 
vacate the pay-roll tax field and allow the States to tax in that area. 
That they have done, but of course the pressure against pay-roll taxes is 
immense, and the States have constant problems with them. 
The last change was an alteration to arrangements in Loan Council for 
borrowings for small semi-Government corporations. Most States had a number 
of these, and were able to borrow up to $2m a year for each of them outside 
the approved borrowing program. That loophole is now closed and the States 
have nowhere to go for money which, in my day as State Treasurer, financed 
many a useful undertaking. 
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This change in the effects of this Constitution has not, of course, worried 
those who see Australia as best governed centrally. The A.L.P. for many 
years saw Australia as best governed by a national parliament with 
unfettered powers, and beneath it a system of local government of 
subordinate legislatures something like the English county system. It was a 
scenario which, for various reasons, was quite hopeless of achievement. In 
the first place, to obtain a change in the Constitution which would 
accomplish this would require a referendum carried by a majority in every 
State. To persuade the populace of its desirability they would have to be 
convinced that the county government system was a reality, not just a 
proposal. Attempts to get regional groupings of local government with 
enhanced powers and based upon commonalty of interest and rational 
geographical boundaries in Australia have never succeeded. The ambitious 
plans for "regionalisation" of Australia, made in 1949 under Jack Dedman, 
were thrown away by the Menzies' Government and never revived. So there is 
nothing to offer the people as an alternative to which they would commit 
themselves. 
A single national parliament in Australia would not work as a means of 
governing the country and attending to local needs as does the present 
system. In the Westminster System members are agents for their districts. 
It is possible to raise issues affecting individuals and organisations in a 
member's district in the Parliament. Contrast this with the enormous 
difficulty a British Member of Parliament has - the problem of dealing .with 
the national business and the concerns of districts in one chamber of 600-
odd members is insurmountable, and has led to constant demands for 
devolution and for separate parliaments for Wales and Scotland. In this 
country, where the distances are much greater, the case for devolution 
is clear. Given our constitution, that must be through the States, 
unsatisfactory though they may be. However, that requires continuing work 
to achieve a better and more certain arrangement of finances between the 
States and the Commonwealth. 
That will not be achieved by attempting to bulldoze the States. Gough 
Whitlam tried to do it - he cut back on the amounts paid to the States in 
general revenue grants and offered money in tied grants, seeking to transfer 
the decision-making on policy to the Federal Government. It didn't work. I 
was the only State Premier then who co-operated in taking the tied grants 
unequivocally, but they did not substitute for money for day-to-day 
administration, the lack of which hurt our own Labor constituency, and over 
which I had to battle Gough at party level and publicly. 
The States, like the poor, we have always with us. If services are to 
continue to be delivered to the Australian people, they must be financially 
viable. 
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